Donald Hodel was Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Energy before moving over to become the Secretary of the Interior for the president’s second term.

This interview was part of a series of public conversations with former Interior secretaries conducted by Charles Wilkinson and Patty Limerick, cofounders of the Center of the American West at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The series was cosponsored by the Nature Conservancy and Headwaters News.

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Patty Limerick: Our guest has had a number of important roles in the federal government regarding resource issues: Undersecretary of the Interior from 1981 to 1982 when Secretary Watt was in office, Secretary of Energy from 1982 to 1985, Secretary of the Department of the Interior from 1985 to 1989.

Secretary Hodel was born and raised in Portland, Oregon. He made that journey to the east that often confirms a person’s deeper sense of Western-ness. There is no better place to discover yourself, as a Westerner, than Cambridge, Massachusetts. It seems a little paradoxical, but it works. He returned to the West, determined through his time on the East Coast, that the West was the place where he wanted to be. He got his law degree at the University of Oregon Law School, where Charles Wilkinson was for a long time too.

He worked quite a number of years at the Washington Public Power Supply System as the Administrator and Deputy there. He became through this work a recognized expert in energy issues. He worked at the Bonneville Power Administration, I’m sorry, that’s where he was Administrator: He was the Deputy Administrator then the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, and acquired again extensive experience in energy that he carried on into the federal government.

Jim Watt and he had gotten to know each other early on, and when Watt became Secretary he asked to have Don Hodel as his Undersecretary. He then left Interior to become Secretary of Energy. As Secretary of Energy he had many adventures traveling around the world and the nation, and then another adventure driving an electric car, which raised questions about how you refuel an electric car.

Then, after Jim Watt had departed and after Bill Clark had completed his term as Secretary of Energy he moved over to the Department of Interior and was sworn in as Secretary of the Interior. Traveling the West was a big part of being Secretary, this is a trip to Alaska that we’re seeing here [gestures to picture on projector screen]. He was a very popular speaker in the West, and in these years was the third most successful fundraiser there following the president and vice president. As you’ll see, he is a very articulate spokesperson.

Being Secretary of the Interior is such a fun sport, it’s really invigorating to get into office. He started to work on a very promising, very powerful effort to regulate and plan what areas of the California coast would be accessible to oil development. A good plan started to appear, to designate certain tracts for oil development and to remove certain tracts of oil development. That was going along quite well. These are the moments that I am so happy to not be an office holder myself, because that was moving along very well, Secretary Hodel was moving along the wheels, and then the oil companies decided that it was not a satisfactory plan at all and that they were being given tracts that did not have that great of a resource in them. Secretary Hodel had the early experience of being attacked energetically by the oil companies. Just as you think you are moving toward a compromise it turns out that people are upset and you are attacked from the right as well as the left, attacked from the development side as well as the environmental side. That was a most instructive early episode for his time in Interior. It would be applied to other circumstances involving offshore coastal development.

Secretary Hodel was in office at the time of the
waning of the big dam. That had been going on for some time, as some people have observed. Environmental objections, in conjunction with concerns about the deficit in federal government made it seem very unlikely that there would be any large dam projects in the future. There is a quotation here on the PowerPoint that Secretary Hodel said in 1987: “The most gigantic projects are already done, or in the process of being built, or already rejected on economic or environmental grounds.” Again, this was an evolving process, but it was really Secretary Hodel’s time in office that informed the nation that the era of planning big dams had come to a halt.

Now, here is a very remarkable dimension of our guest, on the side of what a creative and original thinker he is. In office, he heard of the idea that the dam... Probably everyone in the room has heard of this: there is a dam on the side of the Yosemite Valley, there was a big fight about it in the early 20th century, Hetch Hetchy Valley. A dam to supply water and power to San Francisco was put into that valley, which many said was a smaller but equally powerful and magnificent landscape to Yosemite. That dam had been put into place, and that seemed to be a subtle sign that Hetch Hetchy Valley had been lost to recreation and turned into a reservoir. Secretary Hodel, thinking about this, decided that it would be pertinent and a very wonderful project, very exciting for America and tremendously beneficial for Yosemite National Park, to breech that dam and to restore Hetch Hetchy as a zone of recreation, landscape appreciation, and aesthetic and spiritual value. He had the feasibility of this investigated by the Bureau of Reclamation.

Then, he learned an interesting thing. Mayor Feinstein was of course the mayor of San Francisco, and when she had this idea proposed to her, that they would take down this dam and restore the lost landscape, San Francisco, which is quite a hotbed of environmental opinion, San Francisco was not really interested, and its mayor was not interested in being the particular test case for environmental restoration. So, Diane Feinstein, instead of saying “What an innovative idea, what a wonderful way to restore a lost landscape,” had other opinions to express. A perfect example of how different it is to support environmental causes at a distance and for San Francisco to not want to lose in the way of water and power.

When Secretary Hodel went into office, he spoke often of and practiced a vision of pursuing consensus, consultation, accord. By doing that, he was not really in the headlines all that much. Then, he got in an interesting struggle with this consequential and influential man, Lee Iacocca, and all of the newspapers were saying “Now his name is known, he is no longer the quiet, less visible Secretary Hodel.” I guess that is a lesson to all of us: if we want to get our names in the paper, get into a tussle with this guy and become a household name.

Near the end of his term, the Yellowstone fires were a huge feature of the national news, and that question of whether the federal government had brought smoke into Wyoming: was it the federal government’s responsibility? It was a very interesting study of how the public viewed Interior and the responsibilities of Interior.

I will conclude by stressing something that we will hear more about. This man is a very dedicated outdoorsperson, who is a skier, hiker, fisherman, and a very strong opinion of what recreation means to the American soul. That is a dimension that we will want to hear more about.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Secretary Donald Hodel.

Charles Wilkinson: Well, it is great to have you here, thank you for coming. You had already held high office at EPA and Secretary of Energy, but to Westerners there is nothing like the Secretary of Interior. One sort of monument is the largest secretarial office in Washington, that Harold Ickes created. In early 1985 you were nominated and confirmed, and went to that suite there. Leaving aside any policy issues, just personally, were there any thoughts you had then that really stuck in your mind.

Don Hodel: You know, it’s interesting. When I was told that I was going to be Secretary of Energy, I’m almost embarrassed to say that instead of having these thoughts about “Oh man, here I have a great opportunity to serve the nation,” my first thought was “Oh goody, I get to go to cabinet meetings.” That’s a really exalted thing.

By the time I was going back to Interior, I had already been there and in fact I did not want to go back to be Secretary of Interior. I tried to dissuade the President from appointing me, but Bill Clark, my predecessor who had become a good friend, had much better influence with the President than I did, and it became clear that that is what the President wanted to do. I said to [my wife] Barbara, “We either could go back home, or I could go to Interior, but I can’t stay at Energy and tell my boss who wants to give me a promotion that I’m not willing to take it.” So, we went back to Interior, and it was fairly
different. It was no “Oh goody, cabinet meetings,” it was going back to a department that is just full of confrontation. I am not by nature a confrontational person: I prefer to bring people together and work things out and do things right. I viewed Interior, after having been Undersecretary there and also after eight years at the Bonneville Power Administration, I saw Interior as important to the West, and I really wanted to continue the direction that we were on and improve the relationship between the department and largely the West. There are obviously properties in the east, and there are territories in the Pacific. But, the main impact of the Department of the Interior is in the West. I felt that if I was going to go back there then I needed to try to have a positive impact on the Department’s relationship with the West, that was what was on my mind.

Charles Wilkinson: At that time, although he had been gone for a year, Secretary Watt’s image was still associated with the Interior Department, and the Sagebrush Rebellion was still very much a debated subject. I know it was one that you wrestled with, how to handle that. I’m going to guess that you wanted to create some distance but not too much, although I’ll leave that to you. How did you, in terms of strategy, think of presenting the department with respect to a controversial, people having strong opinions on both sides, secretary.

Don Hodel: First of all let me say, Jim Watt was and is a close personal friend. I am not inclined to repudiate my friends in public for political gain, so I was in the awkward position of not turning my back on my friend. He had been out since 1983, Bill Clark had been Secretary from October of 1983 until the end of January 1985. There was that hiatus. I will interject here: in the last year before a presidential election, in the mid-term, the message from the White House is “Don’t rock the boat,” that’s in every department. So, Bill Clark’s time as Secretary was very difficult, his job was to keep the lid on all of these controversies that are inevitable inside the Department of the Interior. So, his role was very much that of a caretaker, trying to keep things on course.

I came in after the election. There was an editorial cartoon when I went to Energy, which was Jim Watt twice, and Jim Watt the first had his arm around the second Jim Watt, which was labeled Hodel, and said “Ladies and Gentlemen, let me introduce you to your new Energy Secretary,” because the desire was to lump me with Jim Watt. When I went back to Interior, the question came: was I going to be just like Jim Watt?

Don Hodel: In fact, he urged me to do this and I rejected his advice, it was only after I got a particularly outstanding letter from Professor Limerick that I agreed to do this, Jim thoroughly enjoyed his time here, he felt that it was a delightful dialogue.

Charles Wilkinson: When Jim Watt came out here, the reception was really quite interesting, and quite warm I think. It was a very vigorous evening. It was good to see that happen.

I don’t know if you noticed the seal of the Department of the Interior, I don’t know if you remember, but Jim Watt created quite a controversy, because we turned the buffalo around. If you look at that buffalo, it is facing to the left, symbolically, but unofficially, Jim Watt turned the buffalo around so that it was facing to the right. Outrage! You would have thought we had burned the original constitution. So, I came back, we had a press conference in the Interior Secretary’s conference room, and the press was there and they were fired up. Almost the first question that I got was “Are you going to turn the buffalo around like Jim Watt did?” I was standing behind a lectern, and the seal was on the lectern, facing that way, so I peered over the lectern and I said “Well, that buffalo is facing to the right.” Truly, that was almost the last question that I got about whether I was going to be another Jim Watt in the job.

That was fascinating, because my assignment was to do the same things that Jim Watt had done. The President had a number of things that he wanted Jim Watt to do, and Bill Clark continued to do them, and I was expected to continue to do them. In an interview with a newspaper one time, when we finished the interview one time, the interviewer said “Well, it sounds to me like your policies are just like Secretary Watt’s?” I said “Well, I hope so, I work for the same President.” But, there was quite a difference in personal style between Jim and me. Jim was a very forthright, direct person, who didn’t take guff off of anybody. I did. I took guff, I’m easy on guff.

Charles Wilkinson: It is interesting, though... I lived through those days, and I remember thinking of you as very much a breath of fresh air, and I would have trouble concluding that your policies were the same as Jim Watts, although you just suggested that they were.
in a University community: if you get 20 percent perfect, and miss 80 percent, you flunk. If you get 0 percent on substance but are perfect in style, that’s 80 points, that’s passing in any class. Unfortunately, Jim had made up his mind that he had to be aggressive in the changes that he wanted to make in the department. Once he had made those changes, Bill Clark was very low key, and I tried to be conciliatory, and we did not change those policies significantly. I’m trying to think of any major policies that we changed from what we tried to do in the beginning.

Of course, I was involved in those initial policies under Jim Watt because I was his undersecretary. That meant that I served as the chief operating office. Really, what happened is that the secretary and the undersecretary and the assistant secretaries would make policy decisions, and once those were made it was up to the undersecretary to make sure that they got implemented. Jim Watt came into my office one day and said “You know, I just figured out that you have the interesting job around here.” He was off doing speeches and testifying and interviewing with reporters, and had no time to run the department. That’s the case, as secretary, if you have time to run the department, you aren’t behaving as secretary.

I was there when those policies were put in place. I may go through the records and find policies that we changed, but I think that we basically tried to chart the same course.

**Charles Wilkinson:** Well, let me give you a wild eyed idea that I’m sure Secretary Watt also would have proposed, and that is the decommissioning of Hetch Hetchy Dam.

**Don Hodel:** I’m not sure he would have. He’s smarter than I am.

**Charles Wilkinson:** I don’t think so either. To be serious, because that is such an interesting proposal, and as Patty indicated it really was on any list of the top five controversies of the West, with John Muir and Gifford Pinchot involved, and even Teddy Roosevelt a little bit at one point. San Francisco got the park, took it out of Yosemite...

**Don Hodel:** Left it in Yosemite. It’s still part of Yosemite, took it out of use in Yosemite.

**Charles Wilkinson:** Right. Tell us, and take your time with it, about how that idea came to you, and looking back at it how you feel about it.

**Don Hodel:** It did not just come out of the air. I was visiting Yosemite... The problem with Yosemite National Park is that we have a million acre park, yet everybody wants to crowd into the same 5,400 acres, which is Yosemite Valley. I am repeating now what a fellow told me, because I don’t recall this as such, but it sounds right to me. Ike Livermore, who was Governor Reagan’s Director of Natural Resources in the state of California, was with me at Yosemite. He said to me, and this is what he’s told me since, he said to me “You know, there’s another valley like this, just up the road a ways, but it’s flooded by the O’Shaughnessy Dam. You ought to look into whether that could be removed.” I thought that was an excellent idea. I love the national parks, my parents loved the national parks, they were naturalized citizens of the United States and loved the country and loved the parks. So I thought, “That’s worth looking into.”

I went back to the Bureau of Reclamation and said “Take a look at that system.” They looked at it, kind of a back of the envelope kind of study, Dave Haisten of the Bureau came into my office and said “It looks to us like we would have more water for San Francisco, and would replace the water, if you would take Hetch Hetchy out and use the system in a more coordinated fashion.” It turned out that San Francisco was basically ignoring everyone’s operations, running their own water through the system, and water was being wasted, which is crazy in California. That was the trigger for me. I didn’t think it was practical to go out and suggest the removal of a dam and leave a city like San Francisco without a water supply and lose the power, which was $50 million per year of power that was being sold by the city of San Francisco. By the way, they paid the Park Service thirty thousand dollars per year to have the dam there, for which they made $50 million per year selling the power. Can you imagine if that were a private company that had that dam there, what we would say and do? We tried to even raise the rate a little bit, and they wouldn’t hear of it. That’s a god given right, in San Francisco, to make $49.7 million a year selling power out of a national park.

With that, I then called Mike McCloskey, who was the Executive Director of the Sierra Club. Kind of a strange bedfellow, but Mike and I had gone to college together and law school together. He was as far on his side of the political spectrum as I was on the right side. But, he knew me, and I knew that he would trust me. I said “Mike, this is what I would like to do,” and he was excited about it, and I said “I need your help with the leaders of the environmental organizations,” because they would say “Oh, this is...
not real, Hodel is not serious, this is just a smokescreen,” and I was serious. He trusted my integrity, which I appreciate, and he was very helpful.

I then called Mayor Feinstein, and she went ballistic. She didn’t want to hear about the idea, she was opposed to it, she didn’t want a study of it. It was just absolutely, wouldn’t even consider it, which really kind of upset me, because I thought it deserved a real study. So, we were prepared to go forward with the study and Mayor Feinstein got the California delegation to cause the chairman of our subcommittee to put some language in that said that not one penny of our appropriation could be spent to study whether or not Hetch Hetchy Dam could be removed. So, that was the end of it for us.

The exciting thing was that the group of people who have unquestioned environmental credentials in the San Francisco have formed an organization called Restore Hetch Hetch, and they are pushing aggressively, and they have commissioned a study which says that it is feasible, it can be done. San Francisco now says that it would be environmentally damaging to take the dam out, because of all of the noise and dust, then trucking it out, and there will be debris and it will be noisy and you can’t tolerate that kind of thing.

I got a letter just before I came here from a lawyer in Fresno who was intrigued with this idea, he said “Why don’t you leave the dam, poke a hole in it, let the water out, leave the dam there as a monument showing what we once did to this great national park.” That rang my bell. The largest national park in America is in Alaska, the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park, it only has two short roads into it, one from the north and one from the south. The one from the south is the most heavily traveled, because there is an old copper smelter there and people drive in to see it, it’s a tourist attraction, something to do. The rest of the park is pristine because you have to go in on foot, and few people do that. I thought that that would save several hundred million dollars in restoring Hetch Hetchy and get over a big hurdle. I pressed that forward to the committee and I hope that they take it to heart.

Let me put it this way: Can you imagine the reaction if Hetch Hetchy had not been damned following that law in 1913. If somebody today said, “Let’s put a dam there for the city of San Francisco.” It’s unthinkable. There wouldn’t be the slightest support for it today. If there is that clear of a decision that it should not be built if the opportunity was there today, then all that you’re saying is how do we figure out how to remove it, because it doesn’t belong there. I believe that it will eventually be removed. If San Francisco resists strongly enough, a movement will develop, and I would like to lead it, that suggests that their profits from the last hundred years are more than enough to support San Francisco and they shouldn’t get a penny from future power revenues. If I was running San Francisco, I would say “Let’s get on this wagon and say that whatever they do, they will reimburse us for our lost power revenues.”

Charles Wilkinson: Well, it will come out someday, and it will always be known as your idea.

Don Hodel: Well, Ike Livermore probably deserves the credit.

Charles Wilkinson: Now, we in the Southwest have a modest impoundment called Glen Canyon Dam, and I wonder if you would be interested... [Hodel shakes his head no] [Laughs] Well, never mind, Patty, you may have some questions.

Patty Limerick: What I want you to talk about is the perception of what the Reagan administration did at Interior and what you see as the reality of what the Reagan administration did at Interior. I think that may have something to do with Charles wondering if you really were following the same policies as Watt. Could you begin with the story of the famous quotation from Jim Watt about how we must squander our resources as fast as we can because the second coming is imminent? Could you tell that story and the story of your sunglasses and hat quotation, and then go into the substance of the policies as you see it?

Don Hodel: One of the hardest things to deal with is a statement that is absolutely made out of... most of us believe that if somebody says something about you you must have done or said something like that. If you haven’t, it’s almost impossible to frame it a proper response that explains it. Jim Watt was testifying before a congressional committee, and congressman Jim Weaver, from the state of Oregon, asked him something like “Mr. Secretary, is the reason you don’t believe in conservation of resources that you believe in the immanent second coming of the Lord?” Patty knows better than I do exactly what Jim Watt responded, because she’s looked at the transcript and I haven’t looked at that stuff in years, but basically Jim said an “I can’t believe you said that,” type answer. Within a day, the National Wildlife Federation had picked that up and converted it into a statement by Jim Watt that the reason that he didn’t favor conservation, which is a false premise,
was because he believed in the immanent coming of the Lord. We could never catch that story. Enormous sums of money were raised for the environmental movement by touting that story, but there was no truth to it. If you understand anything about the Christian view on resources and stewardship, it’s not a valid accusation.

Sunglasses and hats is a little bit different. The Montreal Protocol was being proposed as a means of preventing the use of hydrochlorofluorocarbons as a means of washing computer parts. The ozone layer hole, which had been discovered, was growing, according to the measurements, and one of the culprits was thought to be hydrochlorofluorocarbons which were getting into the atmosphere and destroying the ozone layer. A number of countries, including the United States, negotiated a treaty which would ban their use. The Montreal Protocol was the document that was involved. The State Department and the EPA were eager to get that document signed. I really think they wanted a victory that they could point to, and an international arrangement where they had actually negotiated something. There were several of us in the cabinet who were opposed to it on several grounds, including the fact that we believed that there were no viable alternatives known at the time and that the increased cost would be hard on people on the bottom of the economic period, that didn’t make sense to us. We questioned some of the science that was involved at the time.

We learned that the Washington Post was going to write an article about this and misquote me, or put words in my mouth, and my press secretary contacted Cass Peterson, the journalist involved, and said “Cass, would you like to talk to the Secretary and get his side of the story?” She said, “No, I have my story.” The story came out the next day on the front page of the Washington Post, and it said that I had said that the solution to the ozone problem was sunglasses and hats. Those words had never passed my lips at that time, but I’ll tell you, it’s going to be on my epitaph. It’s in Lexis Nexis, and periodically somebody writes an article that says “One of the Secretaries under President Reagan thought that the solution to the ozone problem was sunglasses and hats.” Absolutely a construct. What I will believe to my grave is that a couple of people at the State Department, one of whom I could name, were using that technique, they went to the press, planted that story, because they wanted to blunt my impact in the debate within the administration. The secretary of the cabinet wrote a letter to the Washington Post and said that it was absolutely false, it doesn’t make any difference folks, a front page story is hard to refute.

Patty Limerick: So, the policies, the perception and the actuality?

Don Hodel: Well, in August 1980, the leaders of the ten major environmental organizations headquartered in the Washington D.C. area met in the rose garden with President Carter, and threw their support to him wholeheartedly, and stated publicly that whoever President Reagan nominated to the Secretary of the Interior, would be totally unsatisfactory in the job. Well, it would have been true for everybody, but when Jim Watt came along it was particularly true, because Jim had been in Denver for the preceding ten years as the head of the Mountain States Legal Foundation. The Mountain States Legal Foundation represents people who have been oppressed by the federal government, particularly with regard to some of the environmental laws where they feel unfairly mistreated. Jim defended them quite successfully, so the environmental organizations saw him as an active opponent, an enemy. Here, he suddenly was the Secretary of the Interior. Once that label was put on him, there was no way for him to relent in any fashion.

Jim insisted on a meeting with those ten environmental leaders. I didn’t think he should do it. He had the meeting, they had a program with ten items. At the end of the meeting I was astounded, the meeting had been extremely productive it seemed. Jim said, “I think we can agree on eight of those and work with you on those, the ninth one I’m not sure about, we need to find out about it, and the tenth is one on which we are probably going to just have to agree to disagree.” But, it was an amazing meeting, considering who was in it: Jim Watt, and the environmental leaders. I was kind of stunned. They went directly from the Interior Department downstairs, outside, to a previously called press conference and distributed a previously released press release which stated that they had irreconcilable differences with Secretary Watt over policy.

The label was placed on him in such a way that there was no way anybody was going to cut him any slack. So the fact that he would do things that we thought were... Let me say it: within the Department of the Interior, you have the Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, developmental agencies, you have the Office of Surface Mining, you have the Geological Survey, Bureau of Indian Affairs and a couple of others I can’t think of at the moment. They have mandates by statutes to do certain things. Some of those mandates are directly in opposition to each other. Now, our predecessor had said that as far as he
was concerned, whenever the environment was involved, the environment would win, which I call a mindless approach to an issue. What we tried to do, we had multiple, conflicting statutes, we tried to find what it was that made the most sense in the circumstances.

Sometimes that meant we did environmentally sound things, we added endangered species to the list, we added a couple million acres, we added environmental study areas, we reintroduced the red wolf in North Carolina after an extensive program of community involvement, because the problem is if you reintroduce a wolf, an endangered species in an area where people have rifles in their back window of their pickup, the wolf won’t last if the people don’t want it to. You’ve got to get an angle. We did a lot of things that like that never changed... the label was there, as anti-environment. Jim took the heat because first of all he was the first secretary and secondly he took people on head-on. I didn’t get the same kind of heat because when I came in those decisions had already been made, and it was our job to continue them. I was trying to find consensus with both developmental and environmental interests, because I truly believed that the United States would be best served if we could find a way to protect and preserve the environment, but also develop some of these incredible resources that we have available rather than importing them. We’ve already talked about how I tried and maybe didn’t succeed, but I made the effort, and I would make the effort again if I had the chance. Probably with the same result.

Patty Limerick: We talked about foreign oil dependence and energy independence and national security issues as you saw them as secretary, but how about in the present?

Don Hodel: I still see them in the same way. I do not believe that it is in the long-term national interest of the United States to be as we are now two-thirds dependent on foreign oil for a fundamental component of our economy. It puts a risk on us. It would not be nearly as dangerous in my opinion if all of the people you dealt with were reasonable economic animals. Think about it this way: when Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo, what it did was it said “We won’t sell directly to the United States,” but they would sell directly to Russia, which would go to Amsterdam and sell those contracts to American buyers. The oil still came here.

If somebody in Mexico, for instance, had a limitation, no more than 50 percent of its oil would they be willing to sell to the United States, they didn’t want to be too dependent on a customer, so the Japanese buy oil from Mexico. So, it’s a long way from Mexico to Japan, it’s a short way from Mexico to the United States. Guess what happens to some of that oil? The Japanese buy it, they send to American refineries, and the Americans buy Indonesian oil and ship it to Japan. So, in effect, we get the Mexican oil, but the contract goes to Japan.

So, we are two-thirds dependent on foreign oil, and Saudi Arabia can’t keep its money flowing if it tries to cut off the oil supply, but there are people who are willing to wrap themselves in explosives and blow up things who, if they had their hands on the government, could easily decide to cut off their nose despite their face and terminate the oil supply. That would have a significant adverse impact on the economy of the United States, in fact on the economy of the world. The United States quite frankly might fare better than some other countries in the world because the United States has the financial resources to buy the oil even if the price goes up. Some countries in the world couldn’t afford to do it, and there would be significant starvation or illness as a result.

I just think it doesn’t make good sense for us to say “We won’t even look to see if we’ve got these resources available.”